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LABOR PROTECTION IN THE TRANSPORTATION
INDUSTRY
WILLIAM E. THOMS* AND SONJA CLAPP**
I. INTRODUCTION
When you or I are laid off from a salaried job, absent any con-
tractual agreement, we can generally look only to the availability
of state-mandated unemployment compensation benefits for
relief.' If, however, you or I should work for a transportation com-
pany whose labor force is being reduced, we may have another
avenue of relief - government-mandated labor protection
payments.
The vehicle for easing the effects of displacement in the trans-
portation industry is called a "labor protection plan." "Labor pro-
tection" is a term of art referring to the mitigation of the effects of
mergers of transportation companies upon their employees. 2 Such
labor protection may require an employer to continue a worker's
redundant job. At the very least, the employer must pay moving
or retraining expenses, or cash payments to ensure that the
employee's economic status is not diminished by the merger. In
the air and rail transportation industries, both statutes and regula-
tory. decisions have called for labor protection in merger agree-
ments.3  Sometimes, however, carriers themselves have
voluntarily agreed with unions on labor protection provisions.4
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1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (1982) (allows funding for state unemployment
compensation laws provided such laws pass certain administrative requirements). Other
than state unemployment compensation, supplemental unemployment benefits are all that
is available to most displaced employees. Corporate executives and other high income
individuals can receive job displacement compensation for other avenues such as "golden
parachute" provisions. .
2. Braniff Master Executive Council v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 693 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
3. See United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307, 330 (1961) (Civil Aeronautics Board
adopted a policy of approving airline mergers only if employees of merged airline were
protected); 49 U.S.C. § 11347 (1982) (rail carrier is required to provide protection if an
employee's interest is worsened by a transaction entered into by the employer rail carrier).
4. See Ris, Government Protection of Transportation Employees: Sound Policy or
Costly Precedent?, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 509, 516 (1978). Ris states that in 1936 the majority
of railroads and railroad labor unions participated in a conference which resulted in a
collective bargaining agreement granting railroad employees economic protection from
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With the coming of partial deregulation of the transportation
industry,5 support for the concept of labor protection within the
railroad industry has eroded in Congress and throughout the polit-
ical body. Employees of railroad companies affected by mergers in
the past enjoyed a degree of job protection unequaled in any other
industry. Historically, the cost of this protection was carried by the
railroads themselves, but some of this burden has shifted in recent
years to the taxpayer.6 When this transition occurred, observers of
labor issues began to question why railroaders enjoyed greater
protection than, for example, displaced auto and steel workers.
One reason offered for this special treatment of railroaders is
rooted in labor history and is related to the special position once
held by brotherhoods who were known as the "Kings of Labor,"
and who possessed a great amount of political power due to their
emphasis on political action.7  Today, however, labor protection
does not command a political consensus. Therefore, new legisla-
tion tends to limit the scope and extent of labor protection in the
new competitive transportation environment."
The deregulation of the airline industry has also had a heavy
impact on the continued viability of employee protection provi-
sions for airline employees. The primary motive behind the
deregulation movement was to increase competition amongst the
carriers.9 The result of the increase in competition was to be
lower air fares for the public and increased profits for the air-
lines. 10 Labor protection agreements, however, tend to increase
costs for the airlines. Therefore, such agreements go against the
railroad mergers and abandonments. Id. This agreement became known as the
Washington Agreement. Id. For a discussion of the Washington Agreement, see infra
notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
5. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1551 (1982)) (phasing out the Civil Aeronautics
Board and allowing new entry and free exit from the airline business, and as a result, ending
the regulation regime that was keyed to protection of competitors).
6. See Ris, supra note 4, at 510 (Ris questions the protections afforded railroad and
airline labor by stating that extending such provisions to other industries could be costly to
taxpayers).
7. Thorns, What Price Labor Protection?, TRAINS, June 1982, at 47. As an example of
the great political power of labor in railroad and airline legislation, one of the major
concerns of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 was the effect on labor of public
versus private control of metropolitan transit systems. H.R. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 2569, 2596 (1964) ("any large scale shift from private to municipal ownership of
mass transportation systems could have serious repercussions on labor"). For the text of the
Urban Mass Transportation Act, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (1982).
8. Northrup, Airline Labor Protective Provisions: An Economic Analysis, 53 J. AIR L.
& COM. 401, 401-02 (1987).
9. Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(aX3) (1982).




policy behind airline deregulation and hence, they no longer
receive favorable treatment in the airline industry.
Labor protection agreements have been found throughout
the entire transportation industry, including local transit and
intercity buses. However, this article will examine only the histori-
cal development and present significance of labor protection in
the fields of railroading (Section II) and commercial aviation (Sec-
tion III). The article will highlight the trend that presently exists
in labor law on labor protection issues. The article concludes that
labor protection is no longer in favor with lawmakers based on its
cost to- the industry, the resulting inequality of treatment of cer-
tain. workers as compared to others, and because of the spirit of
deregulation which pervades government transportation policy
today.
II. HISTORY OF LABOR PROTECTION AGREEMENTS IN
THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
Labor protection arrangements were first found in the rail-
road industry as a lingering souvenir of the short-lived nationaliza-
tion of the rails during World War 1.11 The Transportation Act of
192012 called upon the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to
create a plan for consolidation of the nation's railroads into a lim-
ited number of systems. 3 The ICC, however, feared the resulting
effect on rail employment of closing switching yards. Gradually,
the ICC backed away from the Transportation Act's consolidation
mandate and in 1934 began to attach labor protection conditions
to those mergers which it approved.'
4
In 1936, faced with the reality of ICC-mandated labor protec-
tion, railroad management met with the unions in Washington and
crafted the Washington Job Protection Agreement (Washington
11. See Ris, supra note 4, at 511. The railroads were nationalized for a brief period
during World War I and operated as a consolidated system. Id. They were, however,
returned to private ownership in 1920. Id. at 512-13.
12. Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 481 (1921).
13. Id. The tentative plan, calling for consolidation of the nation's railroads into 19
lines, was never adopted. Consolidation of Railroads, 63 I.C.C. 455 (1921). A subsequent
plan, calling for two systems in the East and three in the West, was adopted eight years
later, but never came into force. See Consolidation of Railroads, 159 I.C.C. 522, 558, 567
(1929); Ris, supra note 4, at 513.
14. St. Paul Bridge & Terminal Ry. Control, 199 I.C.C. 588, 595-96 (1934). The first
statute dealing specifically with labor protection conditions was the Emergency Railroad
Transportation Act of 1933 which froze rail employment at the May 1933 level for three
years. Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, ch. 91, 48 Stat. 211, 214 (1934)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 661-669 (1982)). This was a different solution from the
severance and displacement allowances found in today's labor protection provisions, but
the Act had the effect of postponing large-scale layoffs in the worst year of the Depression.
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Agreement). The Washington Agreement became the basis of
most modern labor protection agreements in railroad and airline
consolidations. The essential provisions of the Washington Agree-
ment included compensation for dismissed employees, allowances
for those displaced from higher positions, and payment of moving
expenses entailed in taking jobs in new locations.15 Eighty-five
percent of the nation's railroads eventually signed this agree-
ment.' 6 Although the railroads would have preferred to not
address labor protection conditions at all (since the burden of com-
pensating the laid-off workers rests with the carriers), both they
and their unions preferred to work out the agreement themselves
rather than have one imposed upon them by the ICC.
As evidenced by the Washington Agreement, labor and man-
agement, working together, could always establish labor protec-
tion provisions on their own. Until 1939, however, a question
remained as to the ICC's authority to impose labor protection con-
ditions under its mandate which required consideration of the
public interest in mergers.17 This issue was resolved in United
States v. Lowden'" when the Supreme Court held that the ICC
could require labor protection along the lines of the Washington
Agreement without specific statutory authority.' 9 Following this
decision, the ICC began to impose conditions modeled after the
Washington Agreement.
A. JOB PROTECTION MANDATED BY THE ICC
When Congress considered the Transportation Act of 1940,20
its major concerns were depression and unemployment. 2' Consol-
15. For the text of the Washington Protection Agreement, see 80 CONG. REC. 7661-62
(1936).
16. Ris, supra note 4, at 516.
17. United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939).
18. 308 U.S. 225 (1939).
19. United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 238 (1939). In Lowden, the ICC had
required labor protection provisions as a condition to a railroad merger. Id. at 240.
Opponents of labor protection contended that the ICC had no statutory authority to impose
such conditions. Id. at 229. The Supreme Court stated that "public interest" as used in the
Interstate Commerce Act did not refer to matters generally of public concern, but rather
public interest in the maintenance of a rail system. Id. at 230; Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 5(4) (repealed 1978). Therefore, since the conditions imposed promoted the public
interest by facilitating the national policy of railroad consolidation, the Court concluded
that the ICC had authority to impose the protective provisions. Lowden, 308 U.S. at 238.
Congress has since given the ICC express statutory authority. Transportation Act of 1940,
ch. 722, § 5(2Xf), 54 Stat. 898, 933-34 (1941) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 11347
(1982)).
20. Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898 (1941) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 10101-11914 (1982)).
21. See Ris, supra note 4, at 519-20. Ris states, inter alia, that "any discussion of the
legislative history behind the 1940 Act cannot overemphasize the importance of the
[Vol. 64':379382
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idation plans then before the ICC would possibly affect 200,000 to
400,000 railway jobs, most of which were held by men between
the ages of 45 and 60 whose chances of reemployment were
slim.22  The Transportation Act therefore was established to
impose a statutory obligation on the ICC to provide labor protec-
tion in merger cases. The Interstate Commerce Act 23 (title I of the
Transportation Act of 1940) provided that in the case of a railroad
merger, all employees of such railroads must be placed in no worse
position in relation to their employment after the merger had
taken place. 4 In addition, this protection was to be afforded to
such employees for a minimum of four years from the effective
date of the final action by the ICC.2 5 Therefore, measures were
taken to prevent railroad mergers from initiating another eco-
nomic depression.
The ICC mandated additional standards for employee protec-
tion in a series of railroad merger cases. The leading case arose
from the 1952 consolidation of the passenger stations in New Orle-
ans, and as a result, these requirements became known as the
"New Orleans Conditions. ' 26 In New Orleans Union Passenger
Terminal Case,2 7 the ICC had to decide what job protection should
be afforded railroad workers affected by railroad mergers.2 ' The
ICC determined that railroad workers should be afforded the pro-
tection set forth in the Washington Agreement.29 The Washing-
ton Agreement granted railroad employees a payment from the
railroad for the decrease in income arising from a job change
caused by a railroad merger.30 The Washington Agreement also
provided for the reimbursement of moving expenses, loss suffered
in the sale of a home, and a provision prescribing rates for dis-
Depression in formulating Congressional policy. The worst economic crisis in the nation's
history was superimposed upon a government policy promoting unification of railroads."
Id. at 519.
22. Id. at 519-20.
23. Interstate Commerce Act of 1940, ch. 722, § 5(2Xf), 54 Stat. 898, 906-07 (1941)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 11347 (1982)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal Case, 282 I.C.C. 271 (1952). In New
Orleans Union Passenger Terminal Case, construction of a consolidated rail terminal in
New Orleans involved the abandonment of several older stations and a considerable
amount of track. Id. at 271. The ICC treated this as a merger case and imposed labor
protection on the participating railroads. id. at 271, 282.
27. 282 I.C.C. 271 (1952).
28. New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal Case, 282 I.C.C. 271, 271 (1952).
29. Id. at 281.
30. Id. For the text of the Washington Agreement, see 80 CONG. REC. 7661-62 (1936).
The payments to the railroad employees were to begin from the date of the adverse effect
(when the adverse economic effect was realized) and were to continue for amaximum of
five years. ld. at 7661.
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placed employees.3'
The ICC in New Orleans, however, placed two limitations on
the Washington Agreement. The first limitation was that
employee benefits should be reduced to the extent the employee
received compensation from other employment or unemploy-
ment insurance. 32 The second limitation on the Washington
Agreement required employees adversely affected by a consolida-
tion prior to May 17, 1952 (four years from the date. of the ICC's
order approving the merger) to receive as a minimum the major
protections afforded by the Oklahoma conditions.33  The
Oklahoma conditions differed from the Washington Agreement in
that: 1) employees received 100% protection under the
Oklahoma conditions whereas under the Washington Agreement,
the amount of payment was contingent upon years of service; and
2) the Oklahoma conditions went into effect on the date of the
Commission's order and continued for four years, whereas the
payments under the Washington Agreement went into effect from
the date of the adverse effect and continued for a maximum of five
years.34 If the total amount received under the Oklahoma condi-
tions was less than those provided by the Washington conditions,
however, the employee received compensation according to the
Washington Agreement.35 Therefore, the New Orleans conditions
judicially enacted many of the economic protections for employ-
ees affected by mergers.
A new merger movement began in the 1960s. There were
many reasons why long-time competitors decided to merge. Some
of the prominent reasons included: 1) the economics of scale
resulting from a larger system; 2),the economics of running long
freight trains over long distances in the diesel age; 3) the elimina-
tion of duplicate facilities; and 4) the attempt to compete with the
trucking industry. Assuming that the ICC would require labor pro-
tection in mergers, many of the post-1960 mergers included vol-
untary labor protection agreements arranged by the carriers and
Brotherhoods. This sort of agreement was viewed by rail manage-
ment as insurance for withdrawal of labor's opposition to the
merger before the ICC and the courts. For example, in the Nor-
folk & Western, Penn Central and Burlington Northern mergers,
31. 80 CONc. REC. at 7661-62.
32. New Orleans, 282 I.C.C. at 282.
33. Id.




the carriers voluntarily agreed to reduce jobs only by attrition,36
which in effect guaranteed some employees lifetime jobs.
B. THE RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE ACT OF 197037
Adding to the transportation tumult of the 1960s, many of the
newly-merged railroads filed for reorganization in bankruptcy
court.38  Air competition and the completion of the interstate
highway system boded ill for private operation of passenger
trains.39 In response to the flood of petitions which were filed to
discontinue passenger train transportation, the ICC threatened to
end all intercity rail passenger service.4" Under the threat of a
national transportation crisis, Congress passed, and President
Nixon signed, the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970.4 ' This Act
established the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
to take over the operation of the nation's intercity passenger
trains. 42 The Act also directed those railroads which were being
relieved of their passenger burden to provide labor protection to
their furloughed passenger trainmen.43
The railroads and their unions were unable to agree upon a
voluntary labor protection plan under the Rail Passenger Service
Act.44 Perhaps this impasse was due to the fact that the issues were
too big, or perhaps each side felt that it might benefit from a gov-
ernment-imposed settlement. In any event, the Secretary of
Labor, as authorized under the Act, determined the extent of the
labor protection provisions which were then to be made part of
36. Norfolk & W.R.R. - New York, C. & S.L.R.R. - Merger, 331 I.C.C. 22, 41-42 (1967);
Great N.P. & B.L. - Great N. Ry. -Merger, 331 I.C.C. 228, 276-79 (1967); Pennsylvania R.R.
- New York C.R.R. - Merger, 327 I.C.C. 475, 543-46 (1967). Agreeing to reduce jobs only by
attrition meant that the carriers agreed not to lay off large numbers of employees, although
it would not replace retirees or those who quit the railroad. P. DEMPSEY & W. THOMS,
LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION 303 (1986). Usually, workers with
more seniority bid into jobs, and so the senior trainman would then get the jobs of the
departing railroader. Id.
37. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327 (1970)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 501 (1982)).
38. See Rail Passenger Service Act, Pub. L. No. '91-518, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (84 Stat.) 4735, 4737 (rail passenger deficit for 1969 was $200 million).
39. W. THOMS, REPRIEVE FOR THE IRON HORSE 2 (1973).
40. See Rail Passenger Service Act, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (84 Stat.) 4735, 4736-37 (over one-fifth of passenger trains in 1970 were in
dissolution proceedings before the ICC).
41. Id. at 4736; Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-658 (1982).
42. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 501 (1982).
43. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 565(a) and (c) (1982) (railroad shall
provide fair and equitable arrangements to protect interest of employees of terminal
companies upon commencement of operation in the Amtrak system).
44. The railroads were directed to provide labor protection provisions no less favorable
than those provided by the Interstate Commerce Act in connection with mergers. See W.
THOMS, supra note 39, at 43. Thus the Amtrak takeover was treated as a merger.
19881 385
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any contract between Amtrak and the participating railroads.45
The labor protection provisions imposed by the Secretary of
Labor were based upon the Washington Agreement, 46 although
greatly expanded. For example, the burden of proof was shifted
from the worker to the railroad to prove that the assumption of
passenger service by Amtrak was not the cause of the employee's
misfortune.47 Moreover, instead of four years of labor protection,
the period was increased to six, its base date being the time of
employment displacement. 48  A displaced worker was also given
the option of taking a lump-sum settlement in lieu of a monthly
dismissal allowance.49 In addition, moving benefits were further
expanded, and in no case could the benefits be less than those pro-
vided by the Interstate Commerce Act. 50 Although this protection
was offered to employees of the railroads involved with the
Amtrak deal, Amtrak itself was responsible for labor protection of
its own employees. 5'
The Rail Passenger Service Act dealt only with Amtrak's
assumption of rail passenger service and the private railroads' dis-
continuance of passenger trains. The ICC has, however, applied
the employment protection provisions provided for in the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970 along with the New Orleans condi-
tions to subsequent mergers. 2 For instance, in New York Dock
Railway v. United States,53 the New Orleans conditions as well as
45. As the debt of Amtrak was ultimately to be absorbed by the government, the
taxpayers were for the first time involved in guaranteeing labor protection costs. See P.
DEMPSEY & W. THOMS, supra note 36, at 303.
46. For the text of the Washington Protection Agreement, see 80 CONG. REc. 7661-62
(1936). For a discussion of the Washington Agreement, see supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text.
47. See New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1979); New
Orleans Union Passenger Terminal Case, 282 I.C.C. 271, 282 (1952). In 1971, pursuant to
the statutory authority of the Rail Passenger Service Act, the Secretary of Labor certified a
labor protection agreement known as Appendix C-1. New York Dock, 609 F.2d at 89; Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1334 (1970) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 565 (1982)). Appendix C-1 shifts the burden from the employee to
the employer to prove the factors for the employee's worsened position. New York Dock,
609 F.2d at 89.
48. New York Dock, 609 F.2d at 89.
49. Id.
50. Id.; Ris, supra note 4, at 521.
51. 45 U.S.C. § 565 (1982). Because Amtrak was responsible for labor protection for its
own employees, critics of the Reagan Administration's plan to close down Amtrak in 1985
pointed out that it would be more costly to pay these job protection benefits in fiscal year
1986 than to keep the railroad running.
52. See, e.g., Oregon S.L. R.R. - Goshen-Abandonment, 354 I.C.C. 584, 595-96 (1978)
(protections afforded by 49 U.S.C. § 5(2Xf) (the New Orleans Conditions) and those required
by § la(4) of the 4R Act (which amended Rail Passenger Service Act) provided an increased
level of protection in a railroad abandonment); New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609
F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979) (New Orleans Conditions and Rail Passenger Service Act provisions
applied to railyards merger).
53. 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979).
386 [Vol. 64:379
LABOR PROTECTION
the Railroad Passenger Service Act were applied to the merger of
two small class III terminal railways in New York City. 4 The Sec-
ond Circuit expanded the provisions under the Rail Passenger Ser-
vice Act of 1970 to also include the Appendix C-i provisions.55
The Second Circuit, however, denied any double recovery or
pyramiding of benefits.56 The provisions set forth by the Second
Circuit thus became known as the New York Dock conditions and
were significantly more protective of railway labor interests than
any previously imposed single set of conditions. 7
C. THE REGIONAL RAIL REORGANIZATION AcT OF 1973
The most extensive and controversial labor protection plan is
found in subchapter V of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973 (Reorganization Act) which brought Conrail into being.5"
Subchapter III of the Reorganization Act established the Consoli-
dated Rail Corporation (Conrail) which was designated to be incor-
porated under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania rather than as
a federal agency. 59 The Reorganization Act authorized Conrail to,
among other things, acquire rail properties and operate rail ser-
vice over such properties.6 0 The Reorganization Act was necessi-
tated by the bankruptcies of seven eastern railroads, caused by
deferred maintenance, truck competition, and heavy debt load
due to merger and acquisition costs. 61 Subchapter V authorized
$250 million for labor protection, reimbursing Conrail and its
predecessors for displacement allowances, and job protection pay-
ments made pursuant to subchapter V.12
Subchapter V, the most expensive labor protection provision
in United States history, was designed to curry labor's support for
the creation of Conrail to replace seven bankrupt railroads in the
Northeast which were incorporated into Conrail. It extended to
all employees of Conrail and its predecessors the labor protection
already enjoyed by most employees of the Penn Central and Erie
Lackawanna Railroads under their own merger agreements. 3
54. New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 94. For a discussion on Appendix C-i, see supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
56. New York Dock, 609 F.2d at 96.
57. Id. at 91.
58. 45 U.S.C. §§ 771-780 (effective Jan. 2, 1974, repealed Aug. 13, 1981).
59. 45 U.S.C. § 741(b) (1982) (effective Jan. 2, 1974).
60. Id.
61. See Thorns, supra note 7, at 47-48.
62. 45 U.S.C. § 779 (1976) (repealed 1981).
63. Penn Central Merger and N&W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1967); Erie R.R. and
3871988]
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This meant that employees of other bankrupt eastern lines (Jersey
Central, Reading, Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, Lehigh &
Hudson River, and Lehigh Valley) would either receive Conrail
jobs or receive equivalent labor protection to that received by
Penn Central River and Lackawanna Erie railroaders. Subchapter
V provided all Conrail employees with five years seniority with the
predecessor railroads job protection until age 65.64 This protec-
tion included a monthly displacement allowance equal to the aver-
age 1974 monthly salary, increased to reflect general wage hikes; a
severance benefit of up to $20,000 in lieu of continued employ-
ment; and certain fringe and relocation benefits.65
Where was the money to come from? The Conrail law con-
tained appropriations to pay for the initial burst of job protection
claims, but that money soon disappeared. The Staggers Act of
198066 appropriated an additional $235 million for subchapter V
benefits, but made it clear that after that money was gone, Conrail
would have to fund the benefits from its own revenues.67 During
the first five years of Conrail's existence, it was a significant drain
on the federal treasury, depending upon annual bailouts. Conrail,
however, did become profitable inthe 1980s.6"
The benefits sounded generous, but in theory, the expense for
labor protection would be short-term and limited for Conrail.
Older trainmen would bump those with less than five years ser-
vice, and those displaced workers would not be eligible for any
benefits. Employees might quit and enter another line of work, or
move away from the railroad. However, by doing so, they would
no longer be eligible for displacement allowances. What Congress
did not foresee was the decline in Conrail's traffic to the point
where the normal attrition process would not work fast enough to
reduce labor protection costs. If Conrail were to-bear the labor
Delaware, L. & W. R.R. - Merger, 312 I.C.C. 185, 248 (1964) (mergers covered the territory
from New England to Chicago, merging several eastern lines).
64. 45 U.S.C. § 7 7 5(c) (1976) (repealed 1981).
65. 45 U.S.C. § 775(b) (1976) (repealed 1981). Although this section of the Rail
Passenger Service Act was repealed in 1981, benefits could still be received by railroad
employees if they had accrued prior to October 1, 1981, and if the employee filed a claim
within 90 days of the repeal. Act of August 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1144, 95 Stat. 669
(1981).
66. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
1 0101 (1982)).
67. See Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (94 Stat.) 416. The House of Representatives increased the revised level of benefits
reimbursed to Conrail by 235 million dollars bringing the authorized level to 480 million
dollars. Id.; Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, § 509(a), 94 Stat. 1895, 1955
(1980).
68. See Thoms, Clear Track for Deregulation, 12 TRANSP. LJ. 183, 205 (1982).
388 [Vol. 64:379
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protection costs itself, it would not pay Conrail to cut the work
force since the employees would still be paid the same amount to
not work.
D. SPECIAL LABOR PROTECTION STATUTES
The tide in favor of railroad employee benefits began to turn
against furloughed workers with the liquidation of the Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific Railroad and the reorganization of the Chi-
cago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, two large midwest-
ern lines.69 Congress responded with two restructuring laws,
including labor protection terms less generous than the ICC would
have given to former employees of both lines.
The Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act70 provided that
former employees of the Milwaukee were entitled to eighty per-
cent of straight-time salary for up to three years or a lump-sum
payment not to exceed $25,000.7 1 Similar labor protection provi-
sions for Rock Island employees were called for in the Rock Island
Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act of 1980
(RITA).72 Apparently, a Conrail solution was considered to be too
expensive and Congress did not wish another expensive bailout for
railroads.
While the Milwaukee was restructured (and eventually sold to
the Soo Line, albeit with over 2/3 of its trackage abandoned), the
Rock Island was liquidated with its tracks either torn up or sold to
other railroads. The Rock Island reorganization court7 3 refused to
implement the labor protection provisions of RITA. 74 The bank-
ruptcy court reasoned that claims for such protection would
become a senior claim against the estate of the Rock Island.7 5
Since a trustee in bankruptcy is supposed to preserve the railroad's
estate for the benefit of creditors, the court concluded that impos-
ing labor protection liens would amount to an unconstitutional tak-
69. Most of the Rock Island was ultimately abandoned and what remained of the
Milwaukee was merged into the Soo Line in 1985. See Ingles, The Plain-Vanilla Railroad
Ingests Some Orange Sherbet, TRAINS, Nov. 1986, at 29.
70. Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 96-101, 93 Stat. 736 (1979)
(codified at 45 U.S.C. § 901 (1982)).
71. 45 U.S.C. § 909 (1982).
72. Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-254, 94 Stat. 399 (1980) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1018 (1982)). RITA provides for
subsistence allowances to be paid to the employees, not to exceed $20,000. 45 U.S.C.
§ 1005(aX1982).
73. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
74. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 460-61.
75. Id. at 463.
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ing of the creditors' property.76 The bankruptcy court's decision
was upheld on appeal by the United States Supreme Court.7
E. THE NORTHEAST RAIL SERVICES AcT OF 1981
By 1981, with a new administration in the White House and a
Republican majority in the Senate, the future of employee protec-
tion payments looked bleak. President Reagan had vowed to cut
domestic spending, including transportation subsidies. Office of
Management and Budget Director David Stockman was insisting
that the President cut all funding for both Conrail and Amtrak.
Labor protection provisions, which seemed merely humane dur-
ing the Carter years, seemed like a raid on the treasury under the
new administration. Rail labor's strength was ebbing and the
Brotherhoods were unable to match the collective bargaining
gains of workers in some non-transportation industries. The rela-
tive political strength of labor had diminished as unions now rep-
resented a mere seventeen percent of the industrial work force. 78
In addition, the economic strength of railway unions had dimin-
ished, due in part to the decline of their industry. Also, the mood
in Congress had changed. Lifetime job protection could not be
expected by railroad employees since most laid-off workers in
other industries had only unemployment compensation funds for
security. Labor protection had never been a broad statutory guar-
antee, but rather had been pieced together for the benefit of
employees affected by a particular merger or governmental pro-
gram (such as Amtrak).
The immediate concern of Congress in 1981 was to stem the
flow of red ink resulting from Northeast Corridor (Bos-
ton/Washington) operations by Conrail. Conrail was losing a great
deal of money and the loss was being made up by the taxpayer.
Furthermore, the Reagan administration wanted it sold to the pri-
vate sector. Conrail was the landlord of this line and Amtrak was
the tenant on the busiest stretch of railroading in North America.
Thus, Conrail, a freight railroad, found itself running a multi-track
electrified railroad used mostly by Amtrak and commuter passen-
ger trains. Transferring this passenger-oriented electric railroad
to Amtrak, it was assumed, would bolster Conrail's financial health.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 473. Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, stated that a law such as
RITA, which applies to only one debtor, does not have a uniform application and is
unconstitutional. Id.




As part of the effort to make Conrail profitable for eventual sale to
the private sector, Conrail was excused from the passenger busi-
ness beginning in 1982; its passenger trains were to be transferred
to Amtrak or to commuter authorities.79
Amtrak, which was established to run passenger trains,
employed no engineers or conductors as late as 1981. Amtrak
relied on contracting railroads to provide employees on a cost-plus
basis for Amtrak trains. Amtrak would then pay the railroads their
costs plus a small profit. In addition, Conrail had been established
to run freight trains, but it owned much of the track where
Amtrak ran. Even in the Northeast Corridor, when ownership of
the tracks was transferred from Conrail to Amtrak, 80 Conrail
employees were still used on Amtrak passenger and commuter
trains operated by local transit authorities.
The Northeast Rail Services Act (NERSA),8 ' part of the
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,82 provided for direct Amtrak
operation of intercity trains with its own employees rather than
those of Conrail or other freight railroads.83 NERSA also author-
ized Amtrak to establish a subsidiary called "Amtrak Commuter"
which would operate the suburban trains formerly operated by
Conrail. 4 Amtrak Commuter, however, never came into exist-
ence; the states preferred to operate their own commuter trains.85
NERSA also provided for the elimination of Northeast Corri-
dor passenger trains from Conrail's responsibility, the objective
being to improve Conrail's financial picture.8 6 In addition, Conrail
was relieved of many of its labor protection costs, 7 for with such
an albatross around its neck, no one would buy the government-
owned carrier.
79. Tobey, Costs, Benefits and Future of Amtrak, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 245, 265-69 (1987).
80. See 45 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982) (giving the ICC the power to determine compensation
paid to Amtrak for the right-of-way commuter costs for the Northeast Corridor).
81. Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 643 (1981) (codified
as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1116 (1982)).
82. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 1131-1169,
95 Stat. 357, 643-87 (1981).
83. 45 U.S.C. § 1113 (1982).
84. 45 U.S.C. § 585(b) (1982) (Amtrak Commuter authorized to operate commuter
service previously provided by Conrail).
85. Maryland contracted with Amtrak to operate its trains; New Jersey and
Pennsylvania operated the trains directly; New York formed the Metro-North Commuter
Railroad to run its suburban trains, with which Connecticut contracts for its service.
Congress later directed that Conrail be sold directly to the public, rather than to another
rail carrier. Thoms, Is the Clock Running Down for US. Rail Commuters?, TRAINS, Oct.
1983, at 30.
86. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1102(2), 1103 (1982) (NERSA transferred some Conrail commuter
service responsibilities in order to provide Conrail the opportunity to become profitable).
87. 45 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982) (providing for employee protection provisions different
from those set forth in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act).
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Along with this restructuring, NERSA directed the Secretary
of Labor to devise a new labor protection provision that would
provide termination allowances not to exceed $25,000 per
employee.8 8 Either an employee would be offered a permanent
position with Conrail or he/she would receive a separation allow-
ance of up to $25,000 to help him get a new start elsewhere.89
NERSA also specified the manner by which Conrail could
eliminate certain fireman and brakeman positions. 90 The govern-
ment was to pay for lump-sum severance payments made by Con-
rail to employees who accepted termination, up to a maximum of
$25,000.91 These benefits, however, were limited to $215,000,000
for fiscal year 1982 and $185,000,000 for fiscal year 1983.92 Fur-
thermore, NERSA mandated the establishment of a central hiring
roster consisting of former Conrail, Milwaukee, and Rock Island
employees for preferential hiring by other railroads.9 3 The new
law also relieved Amtrak of many labor protection costs arising
from title V of the Conrail law.
9 4
Government insistence on labor protection was a result of a
long history of federal involvement in.railroad labor policy, ICC
policies encouraging rail consolidation, Congressional concern
about unemployment, and politically savvy rail unions.95 In addi-
tion, the spectre of a rapidly increasing number of unemployed
middle-aged men concentrated in former railroad communities,
unable to find work elsewhere, has probably continued to haunt
Congress.
It is clear, however, that what Congress gives, Congress may
take away. If a Congressional statute gave lifetime job protection
to rail employees, it is apparent that Congress may modify or elim-
inate such protection by statute. Congress is also no longer as fear-
ful of the political power of rail unions as it once was. Organized
labor now contains less than eighteen percent of the work force
and enjoys limited support outside its ranks.9 6 The public senti-
ment appears to regard railroaders, unfairly though it may be, as
88. 45 U.S.C. § 797(a) (1982).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 797a(a) and (d) (1982).
91. Id. § 797a(a) (1982).
92. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (95 Stat.) 396, 583.
93. 45 U.S.C. § 797(c) (1982) (Board shall maintain a register of pensions separated by
railroad employment and place at the top of the list those employees entitled to priority).
94. Id. § 797(d) (1982) (any employee who accepts benefits under NERSA has waived
employee protection benefits otherwise available).
95. See Ris, supra note 4, at 520.
96. WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 92 (1988) (statistics for 1985).
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holding sinecures, and public perceptions are often 'the basis for
legislative policy. The labor protections of NERSA were much less
favorable than those in previous laws, inasmuch as they were lim-
ited in amount ($25,000) and duration, and future transactions will
have much less concern for the fate of rail workers, as large-scale
layoffs become more commonplace in the industrial scene.
F. THE ALASKA RAILROAD TRANSFER ACT
The Alaska Railroad was one of two railroads completely
owned and operated as a public carrier by the Federal Govern-
ment, the Panama Railroad being the other.97 In 1985, the Alaska
Railroad was sold to the State of Alaska and now operates as a
wholly-owned State corporation.98 Transfer of employees to the
State of Alaska was handled differently than the other railroad
transactions since these railroaders were federal civil servants, not
private employees. Nonetheless, a form of labor protection was
stipulated in the Alaska Railroad Transfer Act of 1982. 91 The State
of Alaska was required to conclude a labor agreement with the
railroad unions, retain all former federal employees (except
officers) for two years after transfer at no diminution of wages, and
to give priority of hire to furloughed Alaska Railroad employees. 10 0
In addition, a lump-sum severance option was also required. 1 '
The Alaska Railroad benefits seem much less comprehensive
than the earlier protection conditions but are in line with the
vastly reduced labor protection provided by NERSA. They do not
provide lifetime job protection or generous severance allowances.
It should be remembered, however, that the change on the Alaska
Railroad is merely an intergovernmental transfer, not a merger.
Full scale operation of freight and passenger service is anticipated,
and no great layoff of railroaders is expected following the transfer
to the State.
G. THE ROLE OF UNIONS IN SHORTLINE SALES
The general rule is that the ICC labor protection restrictions
97. See Thorns, The Shortest Transcon[tinental], PASSENGER TRAIN J., Jan. 1981, at 26.
98. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1203 (1982).
99. Alaska Railroad Transportation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-468, 96 Stat. 2556
(1982) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1214 (1982)). Section 1206, title 45, of the United
States Code provides that employees subject to the civil service retirement law who
transfer to the itate-owned railroad shall continue to be subject to the civil service
retirement law, unless the state-owned railroad elects to provide benefits in accordance
with the Alaska Railroad Transportation Act. 45 U.S.C. § 1206(a) (1982).
100. 45 U.S.C. § 1206(a), (b), and (c) (1982).
101. Id. § 1206(d) (1982).
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are not imposed on shortline sales. 10 2 This general rule has, how-
ever, become murkier due to the decision of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in Railway Labor Executives'Association v. Pitts-
burgh & Lake Erie Railroad Company.10 3 In Railway Labor Exec-
utives' Association, °4 the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad (P &
LE) entered into a sales agreement with P & LE Railco, Inc.
(Railco), a subsidiary of Chicago West Pullman Transportation Cor-
poration.105 This agreement would have resulted in the sale of P
& LE's 182-mile rail line to Railco. 10 6 The ICC approved the sale
and stated that the railroads were exempt from the employee pro-
tection provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA).0'0 The
Railway Labor Executives Association (RLEA) filed a complaint in
United States District Court seeking an order requiring the rail-
road to exhaust employee protection measures provided under the
Railway Labor Act (RLA) before proceeding with the sale.' 08
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania granted the RELA's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the ICC's approval did not operate to relieve the rail-
roads of obligations imposed upon it by the RLA.' °9 In affirming
the District Court, the Third Circuit stated that the employee pro-
tection provisions of the RLA must override ICC approval of the
shortline sale." 0 Thus, P & LE and Railco were required to bar-
gain with labor before entering into a sale." 1
As a result of this confusion, the Chicago and North Western
Railroad, contemplating a sale of 208 miles of its railroad to a
shortline, has petitioned the ICC for a decision clarifying its juris-
diction on labor protection in shortline sales. In addition, at this
writing, the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie had decided to liquidate,
102. See Ex Parte 392, Class Exemption for the Acquisition and Operation of Rail Lines
Under 49 U.S.C. § 10901, 1 I.C.C.2d 810, 812-13, 818 (1985) (shortline railways are not
subject to employee labor protection provisions).
103. 845 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 2013 (1988).
104. 677 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1988).
105. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 677 F. Supp. 830, 831,
aff'd, 845 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1988) (W.D. Pa. 1987).
106. Id.
107. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 845 F.2d at 426. The ICC had stated in an earlier
decision that labor protection provisions would virtually never be imposed on shortline
railway transactions. Ex Parte 392, 1 I.C.C.2d at 812-13, 818.
108. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 845 F.2d at 426.
109. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 677 F. Supp. at 835-36.
110. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 845 F.2d at 446.
111. Id. The Third Circuit realized that an order requiring P & LE to bargain with
labor may ultimately cause P & LE to become bankrupt and thereby destroy the jobs the




although a sale to the CSX Transportation Co.' (a consolidation of
the Chessie and Seaboard Railroads) and a consortium of unions
was contemplated. At this writing, the issue is before the United
States Supreme Court.
Most of the rail industry has deferred shortline sales pending
judicial resolution of what rights labor has in the transfer, although
the CSX has continued to file applications for exemption from this
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act. It appears that labor
protection will continue to be applied in rail merger cases, but the
extent of labor's role in negotiations for takeover of shortlines
remains to be determined. Meanwhile, confusion over labor pro-
tection provisions may well halt the development of regional and
shortline railroads in rural and agricultural states such as North
Dakota.
H. CURRENT STATE OF LABOR PROTECTION AGREEMENTS
IN-THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
Following the rash of railroad mergers in the 1970s, the 1980s
saw some downsizing of mainline railroads. The major railroads
saw economies of scale favoring mainlines only. The railroads also
felt that local operators could operate branches more efficiently
than a large railroad. Many discarded lines are now being operated
by independent shortlines which maintain friendly connections
with their former parent. The ICC has not required labor protec-
tion in these cases and the shortlines are able to operate with
smaller crews and relaxed work-rules. 12 The ICC could have
imposed labor protection provisions, but chose not to in an
attempt not to saddle the railroads with any additional costs."13
Currently, rail labor is lobbying Congress to extend the stan-
dard six-year labor protection arrangements to these shortlines.
Such a bill, however, would effectively legislate the New York
Dock conditions in all shortline takeovers. If such a bill is enacted,
rail observers fear that shortlines will find it difficult to obtain new
operators and that capital investors will flee the industry.1 4 The
Association of American Railroads' public information spokesman,
Frank Wilner, writes: "If rail labor is successful in extending this
protection, the economics of regional and shortline railroads will
112. See Phillips, Can They Teach the Elephant to Dance, TRAINS, March 1988, at 20.
(speculating that railroad shortlines are able to operate efficiently without traditional work
rules, and adherence to outmoded labor contracts would mean abandonment of a good part
of the industry).
113. See Northrup, supra note 8, at 405.
114. Id.; see also, Wilner, A Watershed for Rail Labor?, TRAINS, Dec. 1987, at 20.
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be jeopardized, additional rail abandonments most likely will
occur, less rail traffic will be available for feeding into trunk lines
and more productive jobs will be lost."'1 5 Therefore, a mandate
that labor protection agreements not be utilized in shortline sales
appears likely in light of today's economy.
III. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND LABOR PROTECTION
Prior to 1978, the airline industry was accustomed to exten-
sive government regulation and intervention. Congress had
assumed that government regulation was necessary to protect the
interests of carriers, passengers, shippers, and employees.
1 16
Moreover, labor protection provisions were ordinarily imposed as
part of the regulatory structure and as a condition to approval of
airline mergers. 117 With the intent to move the airline industry
rapidly toward deregulation, Congress passed the Airline Deregu-
lation Act of 1978 (ADA)." 8 The basic premise behind the ADA
was to encourage, develop, and attain an air transportation system
which relied on market forces to determine the quality, variety,
and price of air services.19 Thus, after passage of the ADA, the
tightly-regulated airline industry was suddenly exposed to the eco-
nomic and market freedoms enjoyed by most American
industries.'
20
A. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
Government involvement in the regulation of the airline
industry began as early as the 1920s when safety legislation was
first enacted. 12 1 Then, during the 1930s, a comprehensive scheme
of economic regulation emerged.' 2 2 In 1938, Congress passed the
Civil Aeronautics Act which created a five-member independent
115. Wilner, supra note 114, at 21. See also Ingles, Strike 2; It is Hardball?, TRAINS,
Feb. 1988, at 3.
116. Northwest Airlines - Republic Airlines - Acquisition Case, 857 Av. L. Rep. (CCH)
14,537, 14,547 (1986).
117. Id.
118. Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
119. See generally 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302 (1982). Section 1302 of the ADA states that
the Board in performing its functions shall consider the public interest. Id. Competition to
the extent necessary to assure sound development of the airlines along with the fostering of
economic conditions is in the public interest. Id.
120. Jansonius & Broughton, Coping With Deregulation: Reduction of Labor Costs in
the Airline Industry, 49 J. AIR. L. & COM. 501 (1984).
121. Ris, supra note 4, at 523; see also Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568
(1926).
122. Ris, supra note 4, at 523.
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regulatory agency known as the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). 123
The CAB's purpose was to promote and regulate the safety and
economic aspects of civil aviation. 124 In exercising its powers, the
CAB ordered the airlines to comply with current labor legislation,
to set and maintain compensation rates for pilots and copilots, and
to participate in collective bargaining with its employees.'
2
1
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958126 (FAA) continued to
enforce the labor provisions as set out by the CAB.' 27 While the
1938 Civil Aeronautics Act had given the CAB the authority to
regulate safety and economics in the airline industry, Congress
chose to separate the safety and economic regulations in the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958. The Federal Aviation Administration
was now solely in charge of safety regulation. 128 The CAB's only
purpose now was to promote adequate, economical, and efficient
air carrier service at reasonable rates. 129 These economic controls
directly affected labor.
Passenger fare regulation was an example of economic control
exerted by the CAB. In 1938, the CAB mandated that passenger
fares be proportional to the distance traveled. 30 Post World War
II technology brought larger and faster aircraft to the market. The
new carriers were cheaper to operate, but fares were not reduced
to reflect these cost savings.' 3 ' The disparity between air fares and
airline costs grew. 132 Because the carriers could not reduce the
fares, they competed in nonprice ways. The carriers began sched-
uling additional flights, increasing their proportion of unfilled
seats, and offering flight service in updated aircraft. 133 Moreover,
123. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. app. § 1321(a) (1982)).
124. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302 (1982).
125. For a discussion of labor protection provisions imposed by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, see Ris, supra note 4, at 524-26.
126. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)).
127. Id., Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. at 756-57.
128. Id., Pub. L. No. 85-726, sec. 307(c). 72 Stat. at 750.
129. E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 11 (1985)
(hereinafter E. BAILEY). Some of the areas in which the CAB exerted its influence were:
1) controlling entry into the industry and controlling entry of existing carriers into new or
existing routes; 2) controlling exits by requiring approval before cessation of a service to a
point or on a route; 3) regulating fares; 4) awarding subsidies to aircarriers; and
5) controlling mergers and intercarrier agreements. Id.
130. Id. at 17. When the CAB was created in 1938, passenger fares were proportional
to the distance traveled because they were set at the approximate prevailing pullman rates
for train travel. Id.
131. Id. at 18. The Douglas DC-7 series and Lockheed Super Constellation aircraft (L-
1049C through L-1649A) with new engines that enhanced nonstop distance are examples of
service competition. Id. at 18-19.
132. Id. at 18-20.
133. Id. at 18.
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these offerings were more costly and actually offset some of the
cost savings of the newer aircraft models. 13 4 Because the CAB reg-
ulations restricted entry into new markets and fare reductions to
attract new passengers, airlines were also prevented from -using
any operating cost advantages to expand. Thus, inefficient carriers
were protected from financial ruin.
135
By the end of the 1960s, most CAB-certified carriers had
shifted from propeller to jet aircraft, thereby further reducing
operating costs.' 36 This cost reduction did not, however, affect
consumer prices for several reasons. For instance, labor costs rose
consecutively with the new service competition of the jet aircraft.
In addition, regulation's lack of price competition encouraged the
service competition, but at the same time reduced the carriers'
incentives to control costs. 137 All airlines flying the same route
charged the same fare. Consequently, the CAB factored labor and
service competition costs into the route fares, and these costs were
therefore passed on to the consumer.
The economic conditions and the regulatory aspects of the air-
line industry placed the airline unions in a strong bargaining posi-
tion during the period from 1960 to 1970.138 The union's
bargaining position was enhanced because airline travel was
expanding, competition was at a minimum, and the CAB allowed
the airlines to recover their costs.
Pilots in particular benefited from the technological advances
in the airline industry. For example, pilots received higher pay
based on a pilot compensation formula that automatically
increased the pilot's pay as more fuel efficient and larger planes
were introduced.' 3 In addition, more pilots were needed due to
the change in work rules. 140 The new rules also reduced average
monthly flight hours and guaranteed flight time for the duty time
134. Id.
135. Id. at 95-96.
136. Id. at 19.
137. Id. at 96-97.
138. Id. at 97. The Air Line Pilot's Association (ALPA) is one labor union that has
attracted much attention due to bargaining controversies and strikes.
139. Id. at 98. The unions developed elaborate formulas for determining pilot salaries.
Id. Pilot pay was based on negotiated "pegged" speeds which differ substantially from
actual speeds. Id. Negotiated speeds were set lower than actual speeds for jets and higher
than actual for piston planes to compensate for the inequities in pilot pay for jets versus
piston aircraft. Id. Pilot pay was also based on flight mileage, which was calculated by
multiplying flight times by pegged aircraft speeds versus actual map distance. Id. Hourly
mileage rates also automatically increased when aircraft speed increased. Id. Finally, pilot
pay automatically increased with the weight of the aircraft. Id.
140. Id. at 97.
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and time away from base. 41
Other airline employee groups also successfully increased pay
and benefits. Flight attendants' work hours were reduced in line
with pilot flight hours. 142 In general, wages in the airline industry
were higher when compared to similar jobs in other industries. 143
In addition to its power to affect labor conditions via regula-
tion of fares, the CAB also exercised its statutory control over air-
line mergers. The imposition of labor protections upon merging
airlines was consistent with the regulatory structure imposed by
the CAB.1 44 The United-Capital Merger Case145 set the prece-
dent, and the CAB thereafter adopted a policy of approving airline
mergers only if the surviving airline would accept conditions
designed to protect the employees of the merged airline.1
46
The CAB provided that in case of a merger, the surviving car-
rier must: 1) provide for fair and equitable integration of seniority
lists; 2) pay a displacement allowance; 3) pay a dismissal allowance;
4) continue certain employee fringe benefits for a stated time
period; 5) compensate for change-of-residence costs; and 6) arbi-
trate disputes with employees arising under the labor protection
provisions.' 47 Therefore, the labor protection provisions imposed
by the CAB were quite extensive.
The CAB in United-Capital also outlined a complete list of
labor protective provisions (hereinafter LPPs) that were accepta-
ble.' 48 One significant LPP provided for compensatory allowances
to employees affected by the merger, but was restricted to
employment changes due solely to and resulting from the
merger. 149 United-Capital also set out elaborate formulas to calcu-
late displacement and dismissal allowances which were generally
based on the employee's length of service and past compensation
141. Id. at 98, 99. Pilots were flying an average of 60 to 65 hours per month in 1960.
Id. at 99. By 1975, a pilot's actual flying hours had dropped to only 50 hours per month and
has subsequently fallen below this mark. Id.
142. Id. at 99.
143. Id. at 102. Keypunch operators who worked for the airlines in 1980 earned 31%
more than the average keypunch operator in other industries. Id. In addition, airline
typists were paid 41% more while computer operators earned 38% more than those
employed in other industries. Id.
144. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines - Republic Airlines - Acquisition Case, 857 Av. L. Rep.
(CCH) 14,537, 14,547 (1986).
145. 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961).
146. United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307, 323 (1961) (CAB found that the
public interest required protecting airline labor conditions in airline mergers); see also
Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, 59 C.A.B. 19, 31 (1972) (Board has a long-established
policy of considering employee protections in airline mergers).
147. Allegheny-Mohawk, 59 C.A.B. at 31-32.
148. United-Capital, 33 C.A.B. at 342-47.
149. Id. at 342.-
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rate.'50 Moreover, the CAB in United-Capital provided that in the
event of unsettled labor disputes or controversies, either party was
free to refer a dispute to an arbitration committee, although refer-
ral to arbitration was not mandatory. 151
In Allegheny-Mohawk,152 the CAB modified certain policies
previously set forth in United-Capital. One United-Capital policy
had called for settlement by arbitration of disputes arising under
the LPPs when negotiations between the parties failed. 153 Origi-
nally the parties were not required to submit to arbitration until
ordered to do so by the CAB.'5 4 The Allegheny-Mohawk modifi-
cations expedited settlement by requiring arbitration to insure
continued harmonious labor relations as well as efficient and unin-
terrupted service to the public.'55 Additionally, the parties were
allowed to modify the arbitration rules by mutual consent.'5 6
The CAB in Alleghany-Mohawk also clarified burden of proof
requirements in airline mergers when employees were adversely
affected. The burden of proof was never specifically addressed in
United-Capital. In absence of any specific language, United-Capi-
tal did not require any particular burden of proof to be placed on
an employee. 157 In addition, the CAB previously had found that
150. Id. at 343-45. The dismissal allowance paid a displaced employee was 60% of the
person's average monthly compensation over the last 12 months of the individual's
employment. Id. at 343. In addition, the period of payments depended upon the length of
the employment. Id. at 344. If the employee worked between one and two years, the
employee would receive six payments. Id. Twelve payments were awarded to employees
with two, but less than three years on the job. Id. Eighteen payments were awarded for up
to four years of employment and thirty-six payments to employees of nine years or less. Id.
Forty-eight payments were awarded for employees who were on the job from up to
fourteen years. Id. Sixty payments is the greatest number awarded and an employee must
have had fifteen years of employment to qualify for these five years. Id. In addition, the
employee also could elect to take a lump sum payment instead of the installments. Id. at
345.
151. Id. at 346-47.
152. 59 C.A.B. 19 (1972).
153. United-Capital, 33 C.A.B. at 346-47.
154. Allegheny-Mohawk, 59 C.A.B. at 32-33. Although the CAB's order to arbitrate
was affirmed on appeal, it took several additional months before the parties attempted to
choose an arbitrator. Id. This resulted in a delay of one year between the original time of
negotiation and the commencement of arbitration. Id.
155. Id. at 33. The section was modified to include:
(1) a specific provision for an arbitrator and the manner of his selection,
(2) expedited hearings and decisions,
(3) a definite division between the parties of the arbitrator's compensation and
expenses,
(4) a right in any party to refer an unsettled dispute to arbitration 20 days after
the controversy arises, instead of the present 30 days, and to obviate further
dispute and delay,




157. United-Capital, 33 C.A.B. at 335 (Boyd, Chmn., concurring).
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the arbitrators were free to avoid imposing burden of proof
requirements entirely. 58 If it was appropriate to place a burden
of proof on one of the parties, the arbitrators could determine who
should bear the burden of proof under the particular
circumstances. 1
59
In Allegheny-Mohawk, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
requested a modification to clarify the burden of proof require-
ments.160 The ALPA recommended that the burden be placed
upon the carrier to determine whether the employee's displace-
ment or demotion was the result of the merger.' 6' Upon reconsid-
eration, the CAB found that carriers had control of substantially all
material relevant to whether changes were due to the merger or
other causes. 162 The employee would thus face a heavy economic
burden to prove his losses were due solely to the merger.163 Con-
sequently, the CAB found that it was only equitable to place the
burden of proving that a change of employment did not result
from the merger upon the carrier. 164 Thus, the CAB concluded
that when an employee's job condition changed following a
merger, the carrier should have the burden of proving that the
change was not the effect of the merger.
65
United-Capital had provided that labor protective conditions
were intended "to be restricted to those changes in employment
solely due to and resulting from" the merger, whereas "changes in
volume or character of employment brought about solely by other
causes," were not intended to give rise to the labor protective con-
ditions.' 66 The CAB intended to broadly interpret "solely due to
and resulting from" so as not to cut down the protection afforded
employees that were adversely affected by the merger. 67 To
remove any doubt regarding the interpretation, the CAB subse-
quently deleted the word "solely." However, the CAB cautioned
that the individual facts of each case must determine which labor-
related factors caused a change in the employment thereby bring-
ing the LPPs into play.'68
The CAB in Allegheny-Mohawk addressed two other areas of
158. Allegheny-Mohawk, 59 C.A.B. at 36.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 72.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 73.
163. Id. at 73-74.
164. Id. at 74.
165. Id.
166. United-Capital, 33 C.A.B. app. A at 342, sec. 1.
167. Allegheny-Mohawk, 59 C.A.B. at 74.
168. Id. at 37.
1988]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
employee protection. The first issue involved reimbursement for
change of residence. United-Capital had set a policy for situations
in which employees were required to change their place of
employment and thus change their place of residence as a result of
a merger. 6 9 For example, carriers were required to reimburse
employees for household moving and traveling expenses.
170
Employees were also entitled to reimbursement for losses suffered
in the housing market due to residence changes resulting from
mergers.'17 In Allegheny-Mohawk, the CAB clarified these LPPs
by allowing the airlines to exclude reimbursement for a change of
residence only if two conditions were met: 1) if the change of resi-
dence grew out of the normal exercise of seniority; and 2) if the
change was not subsequent to an internal change caused by the
merger.' 72 However, the CAB rejected a recommendation that
would have increased benefits paid to displaced employees if the
jobs they held prior to displacement became subject to general
wage increases. 173 Such an alteration, the CAB suggested, would
not be in the public's best interest.1
74
The CAB in Allegheny-Mohawk also discussed the timing of
employee actions. It was argued to the CAB that no cutoff date be
specified establishing when an employee's actions for benefits
under a LPP can arise. 75 The argument was justified on the
ground that if an employee believed he was injured by carrier
action in anticipation of a merger, the employee should be allowed
to bring an action without regard as to when, prior to the merger,
the adverse change occurred. 176 The CAB, however, refused to
make this recommended change.
1 77
In sum, the CAB concluded that the Allegheny-Mohawk
merger would have no adverse effect on personnel. The general
level of employment would not be reduced; however, the CAB
anticipated a cost savings produced by the elimination of surplus
personnel as a result of the merger. 78 The CAB recognized that
169. United-Capital, 33 C.A.B. app. A at 345, sec. 8.
170. Id.
171. Id. app. A at 345, sec. 9. The employee required to change his residence as a
result of the merger was reimbursed for any loss suffered because his house often sold for
less than fair market value and because losses in connection with home purchase contracts
or unexpired leases were often prevalent. Id. app. A at 345-46, sec. 9.
172. Allegheny-Mohawk, 59 C.A.B. at 38.
173. Id. at 38-39.
174. Id. at 39.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 39-40.
177. Id. at 40. The CAB stated that evidence upon which this recommendation was
based had already been considered and rejected in previous cases. Id.
178. Id. at 69. ALPA requested that the CAB require Allegheny, the surviving carrier,
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the Allegheny-Mohawk merger would displace, reassign, or trans-
fer some personnel, but that these adverse affects would be mini-
mized by the imposition of LPPs. 17 9
B. DEREGULATION
By the mid 1970s most economists had determined that regu-
lation of the airline industry was not needed or even desirable.'8 0
The economists contended that regulation drove up prices and
they believed that if routes or fares could be decontrolled, service
competition (i.e., better drinks, meals, excess flights) would be
eliminated. Consequently, the economists predicted that not only
would fares go down, but that the profits of the airlines would go
up.'81 A cutback of federal regulations was seen as a measure of
lowering costs and correspondingly, consumer prices.' 82 The CAB
began to deregulate administratively in 1977. By 1978, despite a
general increase in the rate of inflation, air traffic had expanded
faster than it had in more than ten years, air fares had declined for
the first time since 1966, and carrier profitability was higher than
it had been since the mid 1960s.
18 3
1. The Effect of Deregulation on the Civil
Aeronautics Board
The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)184 was signed into law on
October 28, 1978. The ADA proposed a gradual relaxation of the
CAB's regulation with a four year phase-out of controls over rates
and routes.' 8 5 As a result, the Department of Justice acquired
authority over domestic mergers, intercarrier agreements, and
interlocking directorates on January 1, 1983.186 The CAB there-
to negotiate with the labor organization to establish an effective method of integrating
personnel and labor contracts affected by the merger. Id. at 69. The CAB denied the
ALPA's request based on the inherent difficulties of complicated negotiations with several
unions, the possibility of unequal treatment of similarly situated employees, and the
substantial additional burden imposed on the CAB if such negotiations would fail. Id. at 69-
70. The CAB feared possible increased costs and unfair treatment for the traveling public.
Id. at 70. Thus, the CAB made no exception to its policy against imposing a requirement for
agreement between the carrier and its employees prior to approving the merger. Id. at 70.
179. Id. at 69.
180. E. BAILEY, supra note 129, at 29.
181. A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 4-7 (1981).
182. E. BAILEY, supra note 129, at 30.
183. Id. at 33-34.
184. Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
185. E. BAILEY, supra note 129, at 34. The CAB's authority over routes ended on
December 31, 1981 and its authority over fares ended on January 1, 1983. Id.
186. Id. at 34.
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after ceased functioning entirely on January 1, 1985.187
The purpose of the ADA was to encourage, develop, and
attain an air transportation system which relied on competitive
market forces to determine the quality, variety, and price of air
services. 18 8 The major provisions of the ADA were: 1) a shifted
burden of proof in route authority cases requiring only a showing
by opponents that entry was inconsistent with public convenience
and necessity; 2) a limited degree of automatic market entry with-
out the CAB's approval; 3) permission to carriers to obtain dor-
mant route authority; 4) a set of statutory zones of reasonableness
for fares and permission to vary fares without the CAB's approval;
5) a reform of CAB procedures, setting tight procedural deadlines
in route and merger cases; 6) an establishment of notice proce-
dures for airlines wishing to terminate service; 7) a provision for a
ten-year Essential Air Service Program to ensure air service to
small communities; and 8) a provision to protect dislocated
employees.'8 9
The ADA was passed in 1978, but the CAB remained in exist-
ence until 1985. The merger of Southern Airways into North Cen-
tral Airlines to form Republic Airlines was the first merger
approved by the CAB after the ADA became law.' 90 Among the
matters considered by the CAB in approving the North Central-
Southern merger was the imposition of labor protection
provisions.'19
Employees of Southern Airways requested that the standard
labor protection provisions be amended to protect the interests of
married couples against the transfer of either partner.' 92 The
CAB denied this request.'9 3 The CAB did, however, provide for
protection of part-time employees, allowing for separation
allowances (a lump sum payment in consideration of being
relieved earlier than anticipated) to be paid in proportion to their
part-time status.' 94 The record did not indicate any evidence in
opposition to imposing some form of labor provisions. Thus, the
CAB rejected arguments requiring elimination of labor protective
187. Id. With the sunset of the CAB, the remaining tasks of international negotiations
and small community air service shifted to the Department of Transportation. Id.
188. Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
189. E. BAILEY, supra note 129, at 34-35.
190. Note, The Airline Merger Cases: CAB Application of Clayton Section 7 After
Deregulation, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 139, 142 (1980). See also North Central-Southern Merger
Case, 82 C.A.B. 1 (1979) (merger which produced Republic Airlines).
191. North Central Merger Case, 82 C.A.B. at 5-6.
192. Id. at 92 (A.L.J. Saunders).
193. Id. at 94 (A.LJ. Saunders).
194. Id. at app. 1, 5.
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provisions.195 The Administrative Law Judge which initially
decided this issue stated that if Congress had intended to eliminate
CAB power over labor protection, it could have stated so explic-
itly.' 96 The legislative history also indicated Congress' endorse-
ment of CAB decisions protecting LPPs.' 97 However, the CAB
reserved judgment on the question of labor protection in the
North Central-Southern merger, stating that the general policy of
labor protection could not be determined in this case without a
more complete record for analysis.'
98
The CAB remained in the merger business. In Braniff Master
Executive Council v. Civil Aeronautics Board,'99 the court deter-
mined that the imposition of labor protective provisions in air car-
rier mergers or route transfers was not statutorily required.20 0
This case concerned a financially distressed airline, Braniff, which
sought to sell its South American route network to gain the
finances needed to support its domestic carrier services.201 The
threat of a break in U.S. flag service to certain South American
countries prompted President Reagan on April 23, 1982, to urge
the CAB to take all steps necessary to ensure U.S. carrier services
to South America.2 °2 The CAB, believing it was confronted with
an emergency situation, approved a fifteen-month lease to Eastern
Airlines of Braniff's South American routes.20 3 The CAB also
decided not to impose any LPPs at the outset of the lease
approval.20 4 Three unions representing Braniff workers, including
the ALPA, the parent organization of Braniff Master Executive
Council (BMEC), petitioned to* set aside the CAB's order approv-
ing the lease to the extent that the order failed to utilize LPPs.2 °5
The court explained that the CAB had historically conditioned
approval of airline route transfers and mergers upon carrier
acceptance of terms which mitigated hardship to employees.2 0 6
195. Id. at 5.
196. Id. at 80-81.
197. Id. at 81-82.
198. Id. at 6.
199. 693 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
200. Braniff Master Executive Council v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 693 F.2d 220, 227
(D.C. Cir. 1982). Braniff Master Executive Council was a petition brought by the Braniff
Master Executive Council (BMEC), an organization representing former Braniff pilots, to
set aside the CAB's interim order approving the Eastern/Braniff agreement for a fifteen-
month period because the order failed to include labor protection provisions. Id. at 223.
201. Id. at 223.
202. Id. at 224.
203. Id. at 225.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 222.
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These terms, known as Labor Protective Provisions (LPPs),
include displacement considerations, integration of seniority lists,
and mandatory arbitration of disputes.20 7 However, the court
stated that the imposition of LPPs was discretionary.2 8 For
instance, the court noted that Congress had broadly instructed the
CAB to rule on such transactions in a manner consistent with the
public interest.2 0 9 The need to encourage fair and equitable work-
ing conditions ranked among several factors relative to the public
interest.210 The court, however, found that approval of an interim
agreement between Braniff and Eastern was necessary to insure
continued United States flag service to South America.21' There-
fore, the court held that the CAB had acted reasonably in not
imposing. LPPs prior to approving the interim agreement. 12 The
court qualified this approval by requiring the CAB to act disposi-
tively on the merger issues within six months if insisted upon by
one of the parties, as opposed to the twelve month period
requested by Eastern. 3
2. Deregulation and Labor Costs
Deregulation also brought forth efforts by the airlines to
reduce their labor costs. The emergence of new non-union carri-
ers was perhaps the most conspicuous result of deregulation.
Existing carriers had to compete with low-cost arrivals like Peo-
ple's Express. Prior to the passage of the ADA, ten major carriers
dominated all interstate airline travel and few new carriers were
licensed by the CAB.2 14 By the early 1980s, several new carriers
had expanded into interstate service. 1
The new carriers lowered their operating costs by flying sec-
ond-hand aircraft, leasing less expensive airport facilities, refusing
to integrate ticketing and transfer services with other airlines, and
being for the most part non-union. 1 6 Consequently, the major
carriers struggled to preserve their market shares during the tur-
bulence of post deregulation. The major carriers responded by
reducing fares to the point of unprofitability and setting up non-
207. Id.
208. Id. at 228.
209. Id. at 227-28.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 229.
212. Id. at 227-29.
213. Id. at 231.
214. Jansonius & Broughton, supra note 120, at 502 n.5.




union subsidiaries.217 The purpose of setting up non-union subsidi-
aries was to take over marginal routes and compete with the non-
union carriers.
In the airline industry, corporate restructuring in which an
airline corporation forms a subsidiary or holding company is called
"double breasting. ' 218  The holding company then commences
operations on a non-union basis enabling it to compete with non-
union competitors. 219 Texas International Airlines was one of the
first to restructure in this manner in 1980. Texas Air Corporation,
its holding company, was founded so that it could operate com-
petitively with non-union regional airlines in some of the high
density northeast commuter markets. 220 Texas Air then estab-
lished its own non-union subsidiary, New York Air, to fly the Bos-
ton-Washington corridor.
As illustrated, deregulation has affected airline labor forces
and the unions. Labor relations, in airlines engaged in interstate
commerce, are governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA).22 ' As a
general principle, it is not a per se violation of federal labor law to
establish a subsidiary corporation that does not recognize the
incumbent union of the parent corporation.222 The subsidiary
may refuse recognition of the union so long as the two companies'
operations are sufficiently separate. 2 3The National Mediation Board, the body charged with enforc-
ing the RLA, has used the "single employer" analysis to determine
if a new entity is really separate from its parent or sister corpora-
tion.224 The four principle factors that govern whether the parent
and the subsidiary constitute a single employer are: 1) interrela-
tion of operations; 2) centralized control of labor relations; 3) com-
mon management; and 4) common ownership or financial
control.2 25
Of the principal factors which determine whether two compa-
nies constitute a "single. employer," common control over labor
relations is most important.2 2 6 The CAB examines the day-to-day
217. Id. at 503.
218. Id. at 504-05.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 505.
221. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
222. Jansonius & Broughton, supra note 120, at 505-06.
223. Id. at 506.
224. Id. at 514. The Railway Labor Act provides that any party to a dispute between
an employee and a carrier may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board. 45
U.S.C. § 183 (1982).
225. Jansonius & Broughton, supra note 120, at 507.
226. Id. at 510.
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personnel operations of the two companies to determine if they
constitute a single employer. 2 7 If both companies are served by
the same administrator, personnel policies and practices, and cleri-
cal services, they will be found to constitute a single employer.22 8
To date, the CAB decisions have concluded that the RLA will not
prevent an existing carrier from forming a non-union subsidiary so
long as the newly created carrier has substantial operating and
management autonomy.229
C. CURRENT POLICIES AND RECENT CASES
According to one commentator, the ADA revised the statu-
tory standard for the approval of mergers by requiring that air car-
rier acquisitions be judged by the same test as transactions in
unregulated industries.2 30 Deregulation required a complemen-
tary policy of anti-trust enforcement to protect against monopolies
similar to that in private non-regulated industries.2 3' The CAB's
authority over these transactions was transferred to the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) in 1985, while the Department of
Justice's (DOJ) role has been limited to that of a participating party
(analogous to amicus curiae) in the DOT proceedings.232 Two
recent orders, the Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Republic Airlines, Inc.
Acquisition Case 233 and the Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case,234
have clarified merger criteria, including labor issues.
The CAB had the plenary oversight of the aviation industry.
The prevailing government view was that oversight was necessary
to protect the interests of carriers, passengers or shippers, and
employees in acquisition or merger cases;235 Therefore, the impo-
sition of LPPs was consistent with the regulatory structure of the
CAB and was deemed necessary to protect these interests.2 36
227. Id. at 510-11.
228. Id. at 511.
229. Id. at 521-22.
230. Roberts, Air Transportation, 54 TRANS. PRACrTIONERS' J. 103, 103 (1986). For
the statutory standards covering mergers under the ADA, see 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1982).
231. Alfred Kahn, "Future of Deregulation," Economic Education Forum, St. Cloud
State University, February 12, 1988.
232. Roberts, supra note 230, at 103.
233. Northwest Airlines, Inc. - Republic Airlines Acquisition Case, 857 Av. L. Rep.
(CCH) 14,537, 14,547 (1986).
234. Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case, 859 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 14,555 (1986).
235. Northwest Airlines, 859 Av. L. Rep. at 14,547. Congress never mandated that
labor protection provisions be required in airline consolidations, nor did it provide any
special job security provisions for airline employees. However, the legislation did give the
Board the power to approve or disapprove airline consolidations using RLA provisions. Ris,
supra note 4, at 523.
236. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
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The CAB adopted the labor protective provisions as they had
been established by the railroad industry. The provisions
included: a duty upon both carriers and employees to settle dis-
putes; an employee's right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing; a prohibition
against changes in pay, rules, or working conditions contrary to
agreements; and a prohibition against contracts coercing an
employee to join or not to join a labor union. 37 Subsequently, the
CAB even went beyond the railroad standards and expanded the
protections to include requirements governing seniority lists,
thereby guaranteeing jobs to senior members of the labor force.2 38
The current administration believes that deregulation has made it
inappropriate for the DOT to include such matters as employee
benefits. By passage of the ADA, Congress intended a free enter-
prise solution. Accordingly, such issues should be decided by air-
line management working through collective bargaining. 39
Previous labor protection had been justified, in part, by fed-
eral statute. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA) required that
an airline merger be consistent with the public interest.240 Section
408 of the FAA also authorized the imposition of just and reason-
able conditions in airline mergers and consolidations.2 4 1 The
DOT's recent position is that although the FAA's public interest
standard required them to consider a merger's effect on fair wages
and working conditions, the Department's role in airline labor
matters was limited. 42 Since deregulation, the DOT has adopted
a policy that LPPs will not be imposed unless: 1) it is necessary to
prevent labor strife that would disrupt the national air transporta-
tion system, or 2) special circumstances of an acquisition or merger
show that LPPs were necessary to encourage fair wages and equi-
table conditions.243
In 1986, the extent of the policy's protection was tested when
Northwest Airlines applied to the DOT to acquire Republic Air-
lines, its largest competitor in the upper Great Plains. One of the
issues considered by the DOT before approving this acquisition
was whether to impose labor protective provisions.244 The hold-
237. Ris, supra note 4, at 525. See also, supra note 147.
238. Ris, supra note 4, at 525.
239. Northwest Airlines, 857 Av. L. Rep. at 14,547-48.
240. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 102, 72 Stat. 731, 740 (1958).
241. Id., Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 408, 72 Stat. at 767-68 (1958); see also Northwest
Airlines, 857 Av. L. Rep. at 14,547.
242. Northwest Airlines, 857 Av. L. Rep. at 14,548.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 14,547.
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ing of Northwest Airlines indicated that private decision-making
would adequately protect employees' interests. 245 The collective
bargaining agreements between each carrier and its unions pro-
vided significant protection for employees against furloughs and
job transfers, including those caused by a merger.24 6 In addition to
the existing contractual protections, Northwest also stated its
desire to resolve merger effects on the employees and to integrate
the two work forces through further negotiations.247 At this writ-
ing, the combination of the two bargaining units has not been
accomplished.
The DOT declined imposing LPPs on the Northwest-Republic
merger because they were not necessary to protect either the sta-
bility of national air transportation or to encourage fair wages and
equitable working conditions. 248 The DOT found that the collec-
tive bargaining contracts would provide significant protection for
the employees and that the merger would most likely create addi-
tional job opportunities. 249 This decision was consistent with the
new policy that the imposition of LPPs upon mergers and acquisi-
tions was out-of-step with the new national policy favoring compe-
tition among carriers and reliance upon market forces to meet the
public's needs. °
Northwest Airlines set out the DOT's new policy guidelines.
For instance, the burden of proof was placed upon the labor-par-
ties to show that special circumstances existed requiring the impo-
sition of LPPs.251 The DOT also stated there was no requirement
to examine specific employee benefits or to review carrier plans
for integrating its operations with those of the acquired carrier in
order to determine whether a merger was consistent with fair
wages and working conditions.252 In addition, government inter-
vention was also unnecessary to assure fair integration of senior-
ity.2 5 3 Moreover, the DOT determined that LPPs would not
245. Id. at 14,548.
246. Id. Northwest's contract with the ALPA provided for lay-off compensation and
relocation expenses in involuntary transfers. Id. Northwest's flight attendants and clerical
and ground employees were also entitled to lay-off pay and relocation expenses. Id.
Republic's contracts with the union gave its pilots and flight attendants labor protection
provisions no less favorable than standard LPPs. Id. Additionally, Northwest had agreed to
comply with Republic's contractual LPP commitments. Id.
247. Id. Northwest planned to continue applying existing Northwest and Republic
employee contracts until a unified contract was agreed upon for each class of employee. Id.
248. Id. at 14,549.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 14,550.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 14,553.
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determine which unions would become the bargaining represen-
tative for the surviving airline's employees or which contracts
would remain in force after the merger.25 4 These issues were to be
handled entirely by the bargaining process between the carrier
and its unions.2 5 These DOT policies were based upon the deter-
mination that private decision-making would adequately protect
employee interests and that collective bargaining contracts would
provide significant protection for the employees.25 s
Additionally, the DOT defined what type of labor strife would
not justify the imposition of LPPs. A single strike at a single car-
rier was insufficient to disrupt the national airline system.257 Thus,
the DOT approved the acquisition of Republic Airlines by North-
west.258 The Supreme Court agreed with the DOT policies and
has held that national labor policy favors free collective bargaining
even if it leads to strikes and labor strife.25 9 Basically, LPPs were
not to be imposed upon Northwest's acquisition because there was
no danger of labor strife that would disrupt national air
transportation.26 °
The issue of labor protection was also addressed when Texas
Air, the large holding company that already owned Continental
Airlines, applied to take over Eastern Airlines. In the first Texas
Air-Eastern 261 case, while the DOT disapproved Texas Air's acqui-
sition of Eastern, it reaffirmed the labor policies set forth in North-
west Airlines.2 62 The DOT emphasized their limited role in labor
matters, stating LPPs represented governmental intrusion in areas
that should ordinarily be managed by private parties.263 The
DOT's policy continued as one which would require the imposi-
tion of LPPs only to prevent labor strife that could disrupt national
air transportation, or because special circumstances regarding fair
wages and equitable working conditions existed.264 Texas Air-




258. Id. at 14,554.
259. Id. at 14,551; see also Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 254-
55 (1974).
260. Northwest Airlines, 857 Av. L. Rep. at 14,554.
261. Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case, 859 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 14,555 (1986).
262. Id. at 14,563-68, 14,570; Northwest Airlines, 857 Av. L. Rep. at 14,537. But see
Joint Application of Texas Air Corp. and Eastern Airlines, Inc., DOT No. 86-10-2, DOT (Oct.
1, 1986). After curing the competitive problems identified by the DOT, Texas Air and
Eastern submitted a joint application and the acquisition by Texas Air of Eastern was
approved. Id.
263. Texas Air-Eastern, 857 Av. L. Rep. at 14,564.
264. Id.
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Eastern, however, clarified "disruption of national air transporta-
tion." According to the Texas Air-Eastern decision, even a signifi-
cant inconvenience was not sufficient to impose LPPs.26 5 The
DOT determined that even though Eastern was one of the largest
carriers in the country, a strike against it would not threaten
national air transportation. 6 6 Thus, the DOT concluded in Texas
Air-Eastern that LPPs should not be imposed for the purpose of
avoiding a possible strike.267 In considering the final orders in
Northwest Airlines and Texas Air-Eastern, it becomes apparent
that LPPs will be imposed only in rare circumstances.
Although LPPs are not readily imposed upon the airline
industry, labor protection can still be sought under the RLA which
governs labor relations in general. 268 In Air Line Pilots Associa-
tion v. United Air Lines,269 the pilot's union brought an action
against United Air Lines seeking injunctive relief for alleged viola-
tions of the RLA during a strike that commenced May 17, 1985.270
A collective bargaining agreement had been in effect since 1981
and it was automatically renewed for one year unless either party
sought a change.2 7' Both parties served notice to discuss new
terms in January 1984.272 United sought to renegotiate pay scales
and the method of assigning cockpit seats to pilots. 2 73 United's
concern was that it would not be competitive in the newly deregu-
lated market without some cost-cuttin g measures. 4 In anticipa-
tion of a possible strike and because of a general shortage of pilots,
United began selecting candidates for its new pilot training pro-
gram (the Group of 500).275 This Group of 500 was not hired to
serve as strike crossovers, but as the strike deadline approached,
United began to see them as strike replacements. United
informed the Group of 500 that if they failed to report for work,
they would never work for the airline in the future.276
265. Id. at 14,565.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
269. 802 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1986).
270. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Air Lines, 802 F.2d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 1986). This
case arose out of a twenty-nine day strike by the Air Line Pilot's Association, International
(ALPA) against United Air Lines. Id. Although the parties reached a new collective





275. Id. at 892. The Group of 500 was not offered employment with United during this
training period. Id. Each trainee was required to sign an agreement that he understood




Apart from the plans regarding the Group of 500, United also
intended to allow "bidding" for positions opened up by a strike.2 77
By allowing rebid of the entire airline, United hoped to induce
pilots to ignore the strike for fear they would lose their present
position as well as seniority for future advances.27 8 United also
made known its intent of hiring permanent replacements for strik-
ing pilots.2 7 9 United was prepared to pay fleet qualified captains an
annual salary of $75,000 and first officers a salary of $50,000.28o
These salary levels were guaranteed even if these pilots were later
reassigned to lower positions.2 8'
In Air Line Pilot's Association, the relevant RLA provision
placed a duty upon both management and labor "to exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning
rates of pay, rules and working conditions, and to settle all dis-
putes... in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the
operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the
carrier and the employees thereof. '2 8 2 In settling major disputes,
the parties are required to first give notice and confer with the
other party. 83 If this fails, they may seek mediation services pro-
vided by the National Mediation Board. 84 Once these procedures
have been followed without dispute resolution, the parties may
engage in economic self-help.2 5 However, the RLA does not per-
mit the employer, under the guise of self-help, to implement
measures intended solely to destroy a union's ability to represent
its members.286
The court in Air Line Pilots Association had to ascertain
whether the various self-help measures employed by United vio-
lated the RLA.28 7  The first issue reached by the court was
277. Id. at 893. United's bid procedure permitted pilots to express their interest in
such things as vacant higher level positions and other pilot domiciles. Id. If a pilot's bid was





282. Id. at 895 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982)).
283. Id. at 895.
284. Id. If mediation by the NMB fails, then the NMB is required to induce the parties
to submit the matter to binding arbitration. Id. However, arbitration is only permitted
when both parties consent. ld.
285. Id. Economic self-help means the parties are not compelled to arbitrate. Id.
However, the types of self-help measures the parties may employ are limited. Id. at 896.
For example, the parties cannot engage in self-help which conflicts with an obligation
imposed by federal law. Id. (citing Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969)).
286. Id. at 896 (citing Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Florida E. C.
Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966)).
287. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 802 F.2d at 895.
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whether United's plan, which allowed pilots who worked during
the strike to "bid" for vacancies, violated any RLA provision.2
8
The court noted that once the mediation and arbitration step had
been completed and no agreement had been reached, both sides
were free to engage in self-help.289 This self-help provision was
intended as a means of continuing operations and inducing a set-
tlement. 290 However, the court also noted that the RLA291 prohib-
its employers from retaliating against employees for engaging in a
lawful strike.292 The court determined that the rebid procedure
used by United was not needed for the continuation of operations
during the strike and that it was devoid of any business justifica-
tion.293 As such, the court concluded that United's actions were
merely meant to coerce pilots to abandon their union member-
ship.2 "94 Thus, the court held that United's actions regarding the
rebid procedure violated the RLA.295
The next issue involved the permanent replacement pilots
hired by United during the course of the strike. The pilots' union
contended that the guaranteed salaries for fleet-qualified replace-
ments were in violation of the RLA.296 In particular, the union
charged that United failed to negotiate the replacement pilots' sal-
aries with the union prior to hiring.297 The court stated that there
was no question that an employer has the right to hire permanent
replacements during a strike. 98 Furthermore, United would have
been unable to secure the necessary help and continue its opera-
tions without the inducement of the guaranteed salaries. 29 9 The
court thus determined that United's duty to bargain was limited to
its present group of union employees and did not extend to the
terms and conditions of employment for replacement of striking
288. Id. at 897.
289. Id. at 895.
290. Id. at 897.
291. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
292. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 802 F.2d at 897; 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
293. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 802 F.2d at 898.
294. Id. at 898-900.
295. Id. at 899-900. United argued that the ALPA was ineligible for injunctive relief
because of "unclean hands." Id. United contended that ALPA's bargaining on behalf of the
flight attendants, photographing nonstriking pilots, and using economic warfare during the
"cooling off" period constituted "unclean hands." Id. at 900. United further claimed that
the ALPA failed to bargain in good faith and participated in coercive acts all in violation of
the RLA. Id. The court examined United's defense, but rejected it by stating that the
ALPA's actions were not unlawful and hence were not a bar to injunctive relief. Id. at 907.
296. Id. at 907.
297. Id. at 908.
298. Id. at 907.




The union also charged that the guaranteed salaries offered to
the strike replacements were in excess of those proposed for
future hirees.3° 1 The court found, however, that the guaranteed
salaries were necessary to keep United running.30 2 The court rea-
soned that if United was prevented from taking the necessary
steps to keep its operations going during a strike, its lawful right to
self-help would be denied.30 3
The last issue addressed by the court in Air Line Pilot's Associ-
ation was the status of the Group of 500.304 The court found that
the district court had erred in ruling that the prospective airline
pilots, the Group of 500, had become United employees on May
17, 1985, the day the union pilots went on strike.305 The court
found that the RLA's definition of employee did not support such a
broad reading. 306 The court determined that employees must be
in the service of the carrier and the work performed by the
employees must relate to the carrier's transportation activities.307
Trainees and job applicants, the court reasoned, simply did not fall
within the RLA's definition of employee.30 8 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the Group of 500 were not United employees as of
May 17, 1985.309
The union further argued that even though the Group of 500
were not employees under the RLA, United still violated section 2
of the Act.310 This section prohibits a carrier from requiring pro-
spective employees to sign any contract or agreement promising
to join or not join a labor union.31I The court stated that although
the RLA shields persons from being coerced into joining or not
joining a union prior to employment, it does not bar an employer
from conditioning employment on reporting to work during a
strike.312 The court found that United had not violated the RLA
because there was no evidence in the instant case showing that
300. Id.
301. Id. at 909.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 910.
305. Id. at 911.
306. Id. at 912.
307. Id. at 913 (citing International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. North Carolina State
Ports Auth., 370 F. Supp. 33, 40 (E.D.N.C. 1974)).
308. Id. at 913.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 914; see also 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982) (no carrier shall require any person
seeking employment to sign any agreement promising to join or not join a union).
311. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
312. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 802 F.2d at 915.
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United coerced members of the Group of 500 to sign agreements
to not join the union as a condition of their employment.3 13
ALPA's final argument regarding the Group of 500 charged
that United violated the RLA by unilaterally altering the status
quo when it instituted the "nonemployee" training program for
the Group of 500.3'4 Section 2 of the RLA also protects the status
quo of pay rates, rules, and working conditions of employees dur-
ing negotiations and contract modifications.315  However, the
court noted that the Group of 500 were never employees and the
change in training practices did not impact current United
employees. 316 The court therefore concluded that absent a show-
ing of some effect of change on the rate of pay, rules, or working
conditions involving employees, United had not violated the
RLA.317
In conclusion, the Air Line Pilot's Association court imposed
the relevant RLA protective provisions upon United and deter-
mined that United's rebid procedure violated the Act. 31 ' The
court did, however, rule that the airline's granting of guaranteed
salaries for strike replacement salaries was lawful.31 In deciding
the most controversial issues related to the Group of 500, the court
strictly interpreted the RLA's definition of "employee." Such an
interpretation greatly reduced, and probably eliminated, the
amount of protection the RLA provides for individuals in the
Group of 500 situation. Moreover, employees adversely affected
by this situation will enjoy but limited RLA protection.
In Trans World Airlines v. Independent Federation,2 ° the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether certain con-
tract clauses between an airline and its flight attendants remained
binding on the airline during a self-help period after a bargaining
313. Id.
314. Id. at 915-16.
315. Id. at 915; 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982) (no carrier shall change rates of pay except as
prescribed in agreements between the parties or as allowed by the RLA).
316. Air Line Pilot's Ass'n, 802 F.2d at 916.
317. Id. at 916-17. ALPA and United subsequently met to decide the fate of the Group
of 500. On April 3, 1987, a Letter of Agreement was signed by ALPA and United. United
agreed to offer employment to the Group with seniority dated back to May 17, 1985.
Recent Decision, Air Line Pilot's Association, International v. United Air Lines, Inc., 15
TRANSP. L.J. 435, 450 (1987). The Group was determined to be junior to all strike
replacement pilots. Id. In return, ALPA agreed not to challenge the Agreement in any
future proceedings. Id. The Group members who accepted employment signed a release
forever discharging ALPA and United from any claims or lawsuits arising from the
Agreement. Id. at 450-51.
318. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 802 F.2d at 900.
319. Id. at 909.
320. 809 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1987).
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impasse.32' Trans World Airlines (TWA) and the flight attendants'
union had previously entered into a collective bargaining agree-
ment which contained a duration clause and dues check-off provi-
sion.3 2 The duration clause provided that the August 1981
agreement would remain in effect until 1984 and then automati-
cally renew itself for one year periods unless one of the parties
served written notice of an intended change.3 2 3 The dues check-
off provision was a means whereby the union collected its dues by
having them automatically deducted from the employee's
paycheck.324
In 1984, TWA sought changes in the collective bargaining
agreement, but did not dispute the duration clause and the dues
check-off provision.32 5 The parties failed to reach an agreement
and were released by the National Mediation Board to engage in
self-help. 26 TWA subsequently implemented new working condi-
tions, including the abrogation of the duration clause and the dues
check-off provision.327
TWA argued that the collective bargaining agreement had
expired by its own terms and that all the pre-existing collective
bargaining contract provisions, not expressly revised, were termi-
nated.328 The court examined the purposes of the RLA, stating
Congress' intent was to encourage collective bargaining in order
to prevent wasteful strikes and interruptions of interstate com-
merce. 329 The statutory scheme of the RLA, the court noted, had
bargaining as its major thrust.330 The Eighth Circuit noted the
Supreme Court's recognition of the central role of bargaining, stat-
ing that when terms in a collective bargaining agreement are not
in dispute, those terms continue to bind the parties.331 Further-
more, a strike did not empower management to annul those terms
of a collective bargaining agreement not in dispute prior to the
bargaining.32 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit found that the dura-
tion clause, which was not in dispute, remained binding on the
321. Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 809 F.2d 483,
484-85 (8th Cir. 1987).
322. Id. at 484.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 491-92.
325. Id. at 484.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 485.
329. Id. at 486.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 487.
1988] 417
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
airline.333 The court also determined that the dues check-off pro-
vision, even though a creature of the contract, was necessary to
the union's representation of the flight attendants and was a recog-
nized working condition under the RLA.334 Because the dues pro-
vision was not in dispute, no reason existed for automatic
abrogation of the provision upon the parties' bargaining
impasse.3 35 In conclusion, TWA was only allowed to make changes
that were truly necessary for its continued .operations and these
did not include the termination of the undisputed duration clause
and the dues provision.336
A recent Supreme Court case, Alaska Airlines v. Brock,33 7
reaffirmed Congress' intent to protect employees affected by
deregulation. At issue in Alaska Airlines was whether an unconsti-
tutional legislative-veto provision that was part of the Employee
Protection Program of the ADA331 was severable from the remain-
der of the Act.339
In its analysis, the Supreme Court reviewed Congress' intent
regarding the Employee Protection Program provisions. The
Court stated that Congress sought to ensure that the benefits flow-
ing to the public as a result of deregulation would not be paid for
by airline employees who had accepted employment at a time
when the airline industry was heavily regulated.340 The Court
noted that Congress enacted the Program to assist employees dis-
located as a result of deregulation. 341 The Program provided ben-
efits in the event of work force reductions to "protected
employees. '342 Protected employees were those who had been
employed by a certified carrier for at least four years as of October
24, 1978, the date the ADA went into effect.343
The first part of the Program established a monthly compensa-
tion program.344 Protected employees were entitled to federally
provided monthly assistance payments if they were furloughed or
333. Id. at 490.
334. Id. at 492.
335. Id.
336. Id. The Eighth Circuit decision was just recently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 108 S. Ct. 1101
(1988).
337. 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987).
338. Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
339. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476, 1478 (1987). See also I.N.S. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (congressional-veto provision held as unconstitutional).







terminated because of severe work force reductions or the airline's
bankruptcy.345 The second portion of the Program imposed upon
prior certified carriers a "duty to hire" protected employees.346 A
furloughed or terminated protected employee had the first right-
of-hire in his occupational specialty, regardless of age.347 The
ADA also placed upon the Secretary the responsibility to assist
protected employees in finding other work.348 In addition, the
Secretary was empowered to require air carriers to file the neces-
sary information to provide this assistance.34 9
In sum, the Court in Alaska Airlines stated that a legislative-
veto provision was unconstitutional. 310  If the legislative-veto
clause was not severable, the Court stressed, then the remaining
provisions of the Employee Protection Program is deemed ineffec-
tive. 35 ' However, the Court reasoned that the legislative history
of the Employee Protection Program supported the conclusion
that Congress would have enacted the duty-to-hire provisions
even without legislative-veto provisions.352  Thus, Congress
regarded labor protection as an important feature of the ADA. In
conclusion, the Court decided that the legislative-veto clause was
severable from the remainder of the Employee Protection
Program.353
D. AIRLINE SUMMARY
There is no doubt that deregulation has affected the employ-
ees of major interstate carriers. These employees were once pro-
tected by the rules and regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board
which gave them job security, benefits, and predictable working
conditions. Many of the employee protections unique to the air-
line industry have disappeared along with deregulation. While
some employee protections were carried forward by the ADA,
certain protections such as the "duty to hire ' 354 have only been
imposed upon carriers for a limited time. The framework for the
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1479. The "duty to hire" protected employees did not apply to employees
terminated or furloughed for cause. Id. Also, the hiring airline was permitted to recall its
own employees first. Id. This second portion was only effective for ten years and was




350. Id. at 1479-80.
351. Id. at 1481.
352. Id. at 1484.
353. Id. at 1482.
354. Id. at 1479. The Employee Protection Program of the ADA provided that a
furloughed or terminated protected employee had a right to be rehired. Id.; Airline
1988]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
monthly compensation program for terminated or furloughed
workers still exists, 355 but to date, no funds have ever been appro-
priated and the assistance program has. never become
operative.
35 6
Recent Department of Transportation (DOT) orders357 have
set new strict policies regarding the imposition of labor protective
provisions on airline mergers and acquisitions. The DOT will not
impose the provisions unless 1) the stability of the national air
transportation system is threatened, or 2) special circumstances
exist which require protective provisions to encourage fair wages
and equitable working conditions.
358
Satisfying either one of these requirements appears to be difi-
cult. The DOT found that even a labor strike against Eastern, one
of the largest carriers in the country, would not pose a threat to
the national airline transportation system. 359 The second require-
ment appears to be equally difficult to meet. The burden of proof
is on the labor party to show that inequitable working conditions
and wages exist. Furthermore, the DOT also factors in the air-
line's financial and operational conditions. Specifically, a carrier
may only be able to achieve profitable operations through substan-
tial pay reductions and changes in working conditions.36
Apparently, the airline employee's strongest source of protec-
tion is the RLA. The core of the RLA is collective bargaining
within certain parameters.361 The parameters on collective bar-
gaining include specified steps. The first requirement is that par-
ties must give notice and confer with the other party.362 If this
fails, the services of the National Mediation Board may be used.363
If an impasse is encountered, the parties may then engage in self-
Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982). For a discussion on the "duty to
hire," see supra notes 346-47 and accompanying text.
355. Alaska Airlines, 107 S. Ct. at 1478-79 (furloughed or terminated protected
employees are entitled to deferral monthly assistance payments).
356. Id. at 1479.
357. For a discussion of recent DOT orders, see supra notes 244-67 and accompanying
text.
358. See Braniff Master Executive Council v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 693 F.2d 220
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (CAB approved a fifteen-month lease without labor protection to Eastern
Airlines to keep air travel to South America open); Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case, 859
Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 14,555, 14,565 (1986) (strike against a major airline is not a special
circumstance).
359. Texas Air Acquisition, 859 Av. L. Rep. at 14,565.
360. Id.
361. Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 809 F.2d 483,
486 (8th Cir. 1987).




help.3 6 4 Under the RLA, however, the self-help procedures must
not harm the ability of employees to be a member of a union, nor
can self-help damages severely limit the union's ability to repre-
sent its members. 6 5 Therefore, even though airline deregulation
has lead to a substantial decrease of labor protection provisions,
the requirements of the RLA are still strongly applicable to airline
labor.
IV. CONCLUSION
Blessed with the protection of the same statute, the Railway
Labor Act, and with similar regulatory schemes under the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, it
would seem that railroad and airline employees would enjoy the
same amount of labor protection. Such has not been the case.
The Civil Aeronautics Board is dead along with the dinosaur.
In addition, the Department of Transportation is loath to impose
any labor protection burden on merging airlines. A reason for this
reluctance may be that the philosophy of the Airline Deregulation
Act placed more reliance on competition in the market place, and
by extension, competition at the bargaining table, to ensure the
well-being of airline travelers and employees. Consequently, no
statute has been enacted to afford government-mandated protec-
tion to displaced airline workers.
There is no huddled mass of unemployed aviators in one place
as visible as are the displaced railroaders of Altoona, Collingwood,
Omaha, and Hornell - all railroad towns which lost the shopwork
of their principal employer. To a greater extent, airline employees
have been absorbed into the world of general aviation or of other
service-related businesses. Airline labor has been relatively unsuc-
cessful in fighting mergers and deregulation - although the
employees of Eastern Airlines have been fighting a rear-guard
action against the depredations of Texas Air, its corporate parent.
Finally, there has been no massive government-sponsored restruc-
turing of the air industry as occurred in railroading with the
advent of Amtrak and Conrail.
By contrast, railroaders have been more the beneficiaries of
statutory largess. The establishment of Amtrak extended statutory
labor protection to those trainmen displaced by the nationalization
of railroad passenger trains. Additionally, the foundation of Con-
364. Id.
365. Id. at 896.
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rail provided severance benefits to employees of bankrupt eastern
lines whose services were to be operated by the new blue giant.
But the brush-off of Milwaukee and Rock Island railroaders
after those lines' abandonment showed that Congress was unwill-
ing to protect the status quo ante of every railroader whose road
was about to be liquidated. The Northeast Rail Services Act of
1981 limited the amount of labor protection for Conrail employees
involved in railroad commuter service. Therefore, reduction of
these costs made state take-over of such trains feasible.
Labor protection provisions are still imposed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which has not gone the way of the Civil
Aeronautics Board. A recent trend has been for spinoffs of redun-
dant trackage to shortline railroads to be halted pending resolu-
tion of labor protection issues. Therefore, in connection with the
establishment of regional railroads, labor protection may still be a
hurdle. However, it is clear that the nation no longer has its heart
in statutory provisions for further protecting the interest of dis-
placed transportation workers.
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